St. John's Law Review
Volume 27, December 1952, Number 1

Article 18

Unincorporated Associations--Labor Unions--Liability for
Defamation (Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276 (1951))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 27

defendant could not assume that he need make no explanation for
the injury on his premises, nor could he avoid liability by relying on
his trust in the
manufacturer, or on the absence of a contract with
20
the customer.
The Court apparently realized the plaintiff's difficulty in establishing his prima facie case in these situations, and extended the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an attempt to achieve an equitable result.
As a result, a customer stands a better chance of getting compensated
for his injuries; but, by the same token, a heavier burden is cast upon
the retailer. The local grocer, under this rule, has a greater duty to
inspect articles purchased for resale, a duty so strict that, perhaps,
he has become an insurer of the safety of those who enter his store.
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FOR DEFAMATION.-Plaintiff brought an action against defendants
individually and in their representative capacities as officers of a labor
union (the latter action pursuant to statute),' for damages resulting
from the publication of libelous material in the union newspaper. The
complaint did not allege that the individual members of the union
had authorized the tort. The lower court denied a motion to dismiss
the complaint against the defendants as individuals, but granted the
motion to dismiss it as against defendants in their representative
capacities. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and held that the statute
is procedural in nature and does not change the substantive liability
of the individual members which must be shown before the action
may be brought against the association officers. Martin v. Curran,
303 N. Y. 276, 101 N. E. 2d 683 (1951).
Courts have long taken cognizance of the common law rule that
an unincorporated association has no legal existence apart from that
of its members, 2 and, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, cannot be sued as a separate entity. 3 Its tort liability, therefore, is predi2

o Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 App. Div. 253, 255, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 436,

438 (3d Dep't 1952).
12 N. Y. Gzx. Ass'N

LAW § 13.
See Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W.L.U. No. 131, 165 Ind.

421, 75 N. E. 877, 878 (1905); St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders'
Union No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N. W. 725, 727 (1905) ; see Fahy, The Union
i, Court, 37 ILr_ BAR J. 203 (1949).
3 St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union No. 37, supra note
2; see Saxer v. Democratic County Committee of Erie Co., 161 Misc. 35, 37,
291 N. Y. Supp. 18, 21 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Williams v. United Mine Workers
of America, 294 Ky. 520, 172 S. W. 2d 202, 204 (1943), af'd, 298 Ky. 117,
182 S. W. 2d 237 (1944) ; Pearson v. Anderburg, 28 Utah 495, 80 Pac. 307,
309 (1905).
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cated upon the individual liability of each of its members. 4 This
liability may arise in several ways: it may be "a public act of the
association itself ... [or] acts of officers, agents, or members of the
association where such acts are known to the membership and actively or passively approved." 5
It is upon principles of agency, then, that the members of an
association may be made to answer for a tortious act committed in
its name.6 The mere fact of membership is insufficient to establish
their liability; ' it is necessary that there be some act of assent or
ratification,8 express or implied. 9
Since, at common law, a suit against the members of an unincorporated association could be brought only in the names of those
members, 10 and it was necessary to enforce any judgment obtained
against them individually,'1 statutes were enacted in many jurisdictions to facilitate the prosecution of such actions.' 2 The New York
General Associations Law 13 permits an action to be brought against
the president or treasurer of an unincorporated association in his representative capacity, and further directs that any judgment obtained
must be satisfied out of the association assets 14 before the individual
members may be sued.' 5 The sine qua non of this statute is that
the cause of action be one which can be maintained against each of
the members.Y6
4 Feinberg v. Basson, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; see Rourke v.
Elk Drug Co., 75 App. Div. 145, 147, 77 N. Y. Supp. 373, 374 (3d Dep't
1902).
5
Tannenbaum v. Hofbauer, 142 Misc. 120, 121, 253 N. Y. Supp. 90, 92
(Sup. Ct. 1931).
6Pandolfo v. Bank of Benson, 273 Fed. 48 (9th Cir. 1921) ; cf. Lamm v.
Stoen,
7 226 Iowa 622, 284 N. W. 465, 467 (1939).
Feldman v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 137 F. 2d 266 (4th Cir.
1943); Sweetman v. Barrows, 263 Mass. 349, 161 N. E. 272 (1928) ; see Malloy
v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376, 191 N. E. 661, 667 (1934).
s See Sizer v. Daniels, 66 Barb. 426 (N. Y. 1873). "A part of the members of a voluntary organization cannot bind the others without their consent
before the act which it is claimed binds them is done, or they, with full knowledge of the facts, ratify and adopt it." Id. at 432.
9Pandolfo v. Bank of Benson, supra note 6.
20 Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W.L.U. No. 131, 165 Ind. 421,
75 N. E. 877 (1905) ; cf. Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., 261 App.
Div. 181, 183, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 860, 862 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd in part, 287
N. Y. 373, 39 N. E. 2d 919 (1942).
"I Cf. Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., supra note 10 at 183,
24 N. Y. S. 2d at 862.
2 ARiz. CODE ANN. § 21-305(3) (1939); Coup. LAws oF MICH. § 613.29
(1948); N. Y. GEm. Ass'N LAW § 13 (1952); R. I. G-N. LAws c. 530, § 1
(1938).
13 N. Y. GEN. Ass'N LAv § 13; see PRASHra,
NEW YORK PRACrICE 78
(2d ed. 1951).
14 N. Y. GEN. Ass'N LAW § 15.
15 Id. §16.
16Id. § 13. "An action or special proceeding may be maintained, against
the president or treasurer of such an association . . .upon any cause of action,
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With the development of the labor movement, workers organized into large, unincorporated associations with memberships reaching into the thousands. It consequently has become, as a practical
matter, an almost insurmountable task to attempt to prove the individual liability of each of these members for acts performed in the
association name,17 since many members may have no knowledge of
the act or even of the appointment of an agent. In the words of
Chief Justice Taft, "[t]o remand persons injured to a suit against
each of the.., members to recover damages ... would be to leave
them remediless." 3s
The practical result of such a situation is manifestly inconsistent
with Anglo-American principles of justice, which attempt to provide
a remedy for every wrong.' 9 If the plaintiff is unable to prove the
liability of every member, the association may not be sued pursuant
to Section 13 of the General Associations Law, and should the tortfeasor be judgment proof, there can be no recovery.
Large trade unions resemble corporations in many respects, exercising many of the same rights and privileges, 20 and their obligations should likewise be those of a corporation. 2' The federal courts,
recognizing that an unincorporated association ought to be suable
as a separate legal entity,22 permit an action to be brought against

for or upon which the plaintiff may maintain such at action . . . against all
the associates... ." (emphasis added). See McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N. Y.

89, 92, 30 N. E. 728, 729 (1892).
17 See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 387
(1922).
a Id. at 389.
19 Consider the common law maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium, as discussed in

Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97, 101 (1909), and Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 199, 50 S. E. 68, 69 (1905). Equity

will not suffer a wrong without a remedy is the application of this principle
to equity jurisdiction. 2 PomERoY, Egurnr JURISPRUDENCE 185 (5th ed. 1941).
The trend today is toward a broader responsibility for tort in other fields.
See McNiece and Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST. JOHN's
L. Rnv. 255, 260 (1952), ". . . [T]here has been a positive trend towards the
extension of liability for negligence and the restriction of defenses ....
20 See United Mine Workers v. Coronado' Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 385
(1921).
Compare 1 BL. Comm. *475, *476 ("After a corporation is so
formed and named, it acquires many powers, rights, capacities, and incapacities, which we are next to consider . . . As, 1. To have perpetual
succession . . . 2. To sue or be sued . . . 3. To purchase lands, and hold

them, for the benefit of themselves and their successors . . . 4. To have a
common seal . . . 5. To make by-laws or private statutes for the better
government of the corporation . . . ."), with Witmer, Trade Union. Liability:
The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, 51 YALE L. J. 40 (1941)
(".... [T]rade unions ... frequently make use of a common seal. In fact they

have as perpetual an existence and as perpetual a succession of interests as
the corporation.

Actually they own property even though to do so they may

have to employ trustees. And it cannot be denied that they make by-laws 'or
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such an organization, where the enforcement of a substantive right
under the United States Constitution is involved. 23 The English
courts have taken a similar 24
view and have held that a union may be
sued in its registered name.
It is submitted that the law as it stands today in New York is
inequitable. An organization the size of a labor union, which occupies such an important place in our economy, should be made to
answer for tortious acts committed in its name, without being permitted to raise, as a condition precedent to its liability, the establishment of the individual responsibility of each of its members. If the
courts in their capacity as interpreters of the law feel it impossible
so to construe the statute as it presently exists, it would seem desirable that the law be changed.

WILLs -

ADmINISTRATOR
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Testator had named his widow sole beneficiary and executrix. Prior
to probate of the will, his widow died, naming a bank her executor.
The bank, however, declined to administer testator's estate. Testator's sister, claiming to be his next of kin within the meaning of
the Surrogate's Court Act, although not entitled to share in his
estate,1 petitioned for letters of administration c.t.a.2 In denying
private statutes for the better government of the corporation' ....
Yet these
associations lack that first indicium of corporateness, a charter. They cannot,
in most jurisdictions, be sued in their own names.").
21 See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., smpra note 20 at 38S.
"It would be unfortunate if an organization with as great power as this International Union has . . . in a wide territory . . . could assemble its assets to
be used . . . free from liability for injuries [resulting from their] . . .
torts . ..."
22 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., supra note 20; see Faby,
supra note 2.
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
24
Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of Ry. Servants, [1901] A. C.
426. In 1906, the Trades Disputes Act was passed, providing that "(1) An
action against a trade union . . . or against any members or officials thereof
in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on
behalf of the trade union, shall not be entertained by any court.
"(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability of the trustees of a
trade union to be sued in the events provided for by the Trade Union Act,
1871 . . . except in respect of any tortious act committed by or on behalf of
the union in contemplation or in furtherance of a trade dispute." Trades Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. VII, c. 47, § 4. See cases construing this statute cited
in Note, 27 A. L. R. 786, 797 (1923).
1 N. Y. DEC. EsT. Lmw § 83 (4). Since the estate was valued at less than
$10,000.00, decedent's sister was not entitled to participate under this statute.
2 An administrator c.t.a. (i.e., with the will annexed) is a person appointed

